



Δημωνάκειες Διαλέξεις Φιλοσοφίας 2021/2022
Demonactian Lectures of Philosophy 2021/2022

Το Τμήμα Κλασικών Σπουδών και Φιλοσοφίας σας προσκαλεί στην 4η ομιλία της σειράς των **Δημωνάκειων Διαλέξεων Φιλοσοφίας** για το ακαδημαϊκό έτος 2021/2022, η οποία θα πραγματοποιηθεί την **Τρίτη 17 Μαΐου 2022, ώρα 18:30, στην αίθουσα A007** (Καλλιπόλεως 75), με τίτλο:

**How to defend scientific realism without resorting
to inference to the best explanation?**

Ομιλητής:

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Σύνοψη

Defenders of epistemological scientific realism (ESR) usually implement an explanatory strategy which relies on the so-called “no miracle argument” which is a particular case of abduction or inference to the best explanation. Although inference to the best explanation can play a fruitful heuristic role, I contend that it is powerless as indicator to truth. I then present an inductive defence of a moderate and selective version of ESR. I argue that we have more reasons to believe than not in the existence of a detected (indirectly observed) property when such detection is based on observationally inductively verified causal connections between this detected property and immediately observed properties. Knowledge of causal connections may well provide an - even the best - explanation of observations. But belief in the existence of some directly unobservable properties is not justified by their explanatory power, but by their observationally verified causal role. Some examples are discussed to illustrate this main point.